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“The problem of the Twentieth Century” has yet to be resolved. For nearly every outcome of im-
portance, the distributions of blacks and whites in the United States are dramatically diﬀerent. Per-
sistent racial gaps can still be found whether one looks at educational outcomes such as test scores
(Reardon (2008)) and attainment (Heckman and LaFontaine (2010)) or later outcomes such as
earnings (Neal and Johnson (1996), Keane and Wolpin (2000)), incarceration (Pettit and Western
(2004)), and exposure to violence (Figure 1, NCHS (2009)).
Although these outcomes have received much attention from social scientists, the mechanisms
maintaining racial gaps are not well understood. One prominent theory proposes that eﬀects from
living in a poor, segregated, and socially isolated neighborhood can explain these diﬀerences in
outcomes. The seminal work in Wilson (1987) presents empirical evidence on a trend of increasing
concentration of urban poverty in the US, especially in predominantly African American neighbor-
hoods. Indicative of this trend is that the number of people living in census tracts with poverty rates
of 40% or more increased from 4.1 to 8.0 million between 1970 and 1990 (Ludwig et al. (2001)).1
Wilson (1987) posits that growing up in a neighborhood of such concentrated poverty tends to have
negative eﬀects on outcomes.2
Policy makers have looked to housing mobility programs as a way to mitigate the adverse eﬀects
of concentrated poverty and segregation ever since the promising results of the Gautreaux program.
The Gautreaux program relocated public housing residents in Chicago through housing vouchers
in a quasi-random manner. Those who moved to low-poverty suburbs through Gautreaux had
much better education and labor market outcomes than those who moved to city neighborhoods
(Rosenbaum (1995)). Moving to Opportunity (MTO) was a housing mobility experiment conducted
in ﬁve US cities seeking to replicate the quasi-experimental results from Gautreaux. Households
living in high-poverty neighborhoods were allowed to enter a lottery for housing vouchers. In a
tremendous disappointment to researchers and all those hoping to live in a society with equality of
opportunity, MTO did not reproduce the beneﬁcial eﬀects found in Gautreaux.
This paper presents a new perspective on the interpretation of results from MTO, especially
as they relate to neighborhood eﬀects. In addition to studying the eﬀects of speciﬁc housing
voucher policies, researchers have interpreted estimates of the eﬀects of moving through MTO as
neighborhood eﬀects. This paper argues that such an interpretation of results from MTO conﬂates
program eﬀects with neighborhood eﬀects. The paper provides a review of recent advances in the
program evaluation literature in order to make a clear distinction between the interpretation of
Intent to Treat (ITT) and Treatment on the Treated (TOT) parameters as program eﬀects and
Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) parameters as neighborhood eﬀects. Due to the nature of
the LATE, this distinction helps to clarify that results from MTO are only informative about a small
1Although this number did drop in the 1990s (Jargowsky (2003)), it was not nearly enough to return to 1970
levels (Aliprantis and Zenker (2011)).
2The neighborhood eﬀects considered in this paper are those associated with living in a neighborhood in the US
characterized by this “new urban poverty” (Wilson (1996)), but there are many alternative deﬁnitions of neighborhood
eﬀects (Durlauf (2004)).
2subset of neighborhood eﬀects of interest. The evaluation framework is also used to emphasize that
since the LATE is deﬁned by the subgroup of compliers, diﬀerent instruments will result in diﬀerent
LATE parameters if they induce diﬀerent subpopulations to select into treatment (Heckman (1997)).
An important implication is that alternative housing mobility programs designed to induce moves
to neighborhoods with characteristics in addition to or in lieu of low poverty might induce larger
eﬀects than MTO.
After this review of the literature, the paper uses experimental group status in MTO as an
instrumental variable to estimate the LATEs of various neighborhood characteristics. A ﬁrst step
in this process is to determine at which sites experimental group status was a strong instrument for
neighborhood treatments. Tests for instrument strength show that MTO induced large changes in
neighborhood poverty rates. However, it is also shown that MTO induced remarkably little variation
in many of the other neighborhood and school characteristics believed to inﬂuence outcomes and
that much of this variation was conﬁned to the tails of these characteristics’ national distributions.
Some of the neighborhood characteristics that can be described in this way include school quality,
the female high school graduation rate, and the share of single-headed households in participants’
neighborhood of residence. This step also shows substantial diﬀerences in outcomes across MTO
sites, pointing to the investigation of heterogeneity in program eﬀects from MTO as a fruitful
direction for future research.
LATE estimates at sites where experimental group status was a strong instrument are consistent
with prevailing theories of neighborhood eﬀects. Moves to neighborhoods with low poverty rates,
a high degree of personal safety, or a high female labor force participation rate are all associated
with increases in labor force participation. Moves to low poverty and safe neighborhoods are also
associated with improved health outcomes. And although improvements in labor market outcomes
such as employment and income coming from moves to such neighborhoods are not estimated
precisely enough to be statistically signiﬁcant, these eﬀects are improvements and they are of large
magnitudes.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the MTO experiment and presents some
descriptive statistics. Section 3 draws heavily from a line of research by Heckman and coauthors
(See Heckman (2010), Heckman et al. (2006), and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).) to deﬁne and
interpret several treatment eﬀect parameters when assigned treatment is viewed as an instrumental
variable. A summary of the program eﬀects found in the literature is also presented in this section.
Section 4 discusses the data used in the analysis. Section 5 uses these data to identify the sites
at which the experiment is strongly associated with participants selecting into neighborhoods with
various characteristics of interest. Section 5 then presents a discussion of the assumptions used in
estimation, followed by the main estimation results. Section 6 discusses the implications of these
results for our understanding of neighborhood eﬀects and the design of housing mobility programs.
Section 7 concludes.
32 Moving To Opportunity (MTO)
Moving To Opportunity (MTO) was inspired by the promising results of the Gautreaux pro-
gram. Following a class-action lawsuit led by Dorothy Gautreaux, in 1976 the Supreme Court
ordered the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Chicago Housing Au-
thority (CHA) to remedy the extreme racial segregation experienced by public-housing residents in
Chicago. One of the resulting programs created by HUD and CHA gave families awarded Section 8
public housing vouchers the ability to use them beyond the territory of CHA. The results from the
Gautreaux program came at the same time that much attention was being devoted to the increasing
concentration of poverty in the US (Wilson (1987)), and they indicated that housing mobility could
be an eﬀective policy to mitigate the adverse eﬀects of segregation and concentrated poverty.
The Gautreaux court ruling allowed families to be relocated either to suburbs that were less
than 30 percent black or to black neighborhoods in the city that were forecast to undergo “re-
vitalization” (Polikoﬀ (2006)). Although families awarded Section 8 certiﬁcates were eventually
trained to ﬁnd their own housing, the initial relocation process of the Gautreaux program created
a quasi-experiment, as families at the top of a waiting list were matched to neighborhoods based
on the availability of housing units (Polikoﬀ (2006)). Relative to city movers, suburban movers
from Gautreaux were more likely to be employed (Mendenhall et al. (2006)), and the children of
suburban movers attended better schools, were more likely to complete high school, attend college,
be employed, and had higher wages than their city mover counterparts (Rosenbaum (1995)).3
In the wake of this promising evidence from Gautreaux, there was bipartisan support for at-
tempts to deconcentrate poverty and improve outcomes through housing vouchers (Goering (2003)).
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 authorized HUD to “assist very low-income
families with children who reside in public housing or housing receiving project-based assistance
... to move out of areas with high concentrations of persons living in poverty to areas with low
concentrations of such persons” (Goering (2003)).4 MTO oﬀered housing vouchers to eligible house-
holds between September 1994 and July 1998 in ﬁve US cities; Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and New York (Goering (2003)). Households were eligible to participate in MTO if they
were low-income, had at least one child under 18, were residing in either public housing or Section 8
project-based housing located in a census tract with a poverty rate of at least 40%, were current in
their rent payment, and all families members were on the current lease and were without criminal
records (Orr et al. (2003)).
In addition to implementing the program, Congress also required that HUD conduct evaluations
of the demonstration (Goering (2003)). HUD contracted with Abt Associates to implement a social
experiment by randomly assigning households to various treatments. This was achieved by adding
3It has also been found that suburban movers have much lower male youth mortality rates Votruba and Kling
(2009) and tend to stay in high-income suburban neighborhoods many years after their initial placement
(DeLuca and Rosenbaum (2003), Keels et al. (2005)).
4The threshold for high-poverty was set to follow a common cutoﬀ considered in the social sciences, census tracts
where 40% or more of residents are poor (Jargowsky (1997)), while the threshold of low poverty was set at the median
tract-level poverty rate in 1990, 10% (Goering (2003)).
4households to a waiting list after they volunteered to take part in MTO. Between 1994 and 1997
families were drawn from the waiting list through a random lottery. After being drawn, families
were randomly allocated into one of three treatment groups; the experimental group, the Section-
8 only comparison group, and the control group. The experimental group was oﬀered Section 8
housing vouchers, but were restricted to using them in census tracts with 1990 poverty rates of less
than 10 percent. However, after one year had passed, families in the experimental group were then
unrestricted in where they used their Section 8 vouchers. Families in this group were also provided
with counseling and education through a local non-proﬁt. Families in the Section-8 only comparison
group were provided with no counseling, and were oﬀered Section 8 housing vouchers without any
restriction on their place of use. And families in the control group received project-based assistance.
Out of 4,610 families that applied, there were 4,248 accepted families who participated in MTO,
with 1,310 families in the control group, 1,209 families in the Section 8 only group, and 1,729
families in the experimental group (Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), Clark (2008)). Around two-thirds
of the families who volunteered for the program were African-American, while most of the rest
were Hispanic (Kling et al. (2005), Table F13 in Kling et al. (2007b)). About 25 percent of eligible
families applied to participate in MTO (Ludwig et al. (2001)). Compared to those who did not
move, those in the treatment groups who moved through MTO were younger, more likely to have
no teenage children, to have reported a neighborhood that is very unsafe at night, to have been
very dissatisﬁed with their apartment, to have been enrolled in school, and to have had conﬁdence
in their ability to move through the voucher program (Kling et al. (2007a)). More information on
MTO may be found on HUD’s MTO webpage or the NBER online repository of papers on MTO.
3 The Identiﬁcation of Treatment Eﬀects in Social Experiments
In order to think about neighborhood eﬀects from MTO, we now consider a standard framework
for studying causal treatment eﬀects (Holland (1986), Rubin (1974), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)).
Let Yi(1) and Yi(0) be random variables associated with the potential outcomes in the treated and






1 if treatment is received;
0 if treatment is not received.
The measured outcome variable Yi is
Yi = DiYi(1) + (1 − Di)Yi(0). (1)
Since both treatment states are not observable for any individual i, inference cannot be drawn
about the value of Yi(1)−Yi(0). However, causal inference about population averages can be made
under speciﬁc assumptions. One such assumption that allows for inference about average eﬀects
5on a population, which Holland (1986) calls Independence, is that:
E[Yi(1)] = E[Yi(1)|Di = 1]
E[Yi(0)] = E[Yi(0)|Di = 0].
This assumption is typically operationalized by the researcher’s random assignment of individuals










as an unbiased estimator of the Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE):5
βATE = E[Y (1) − Y (0)].
There are two reasons the ATE deﬁned above is typically not the primary interest of researchers
in the social sciences. First, the ATE measures the average response to treatment in the entire
population. Nearly all social programs are targeted to a speciﬁc subpopulation hypothesized to
beneﬁt from the program. Second, it is rarely feasible to estimate the ATE in social settings.
Individuals are able to choose whether or not to participate in programs, such as job training pro-
grams (LaLonde (1995)), Head Start (Ludwig and Miller (2007), Garces et al. (2002)), or housing
mobility programs like Gautreaux and MTO.
3.1 Identiﬁcation of Program Eﬀects
3.1.1 The ITT
In the case of social experiments, a researcher can typically control assignment but not receipt





1 if treatment is assigned;
0 if treatment is not assigned.
If we assume
Assumption 1∗ Y (0) and Y (1) are jointly independent of Z
Assumption 2∗ E[Y (0)] < ∞ and E[Y (1)] < ∞,
5From this point forward individual subscripts i will be dropped, but it is understood that expectations are taken
over the population of individuals.
6then by comparing the outcome variable Y at two diﬀerent values of assigned treatment, Z = 1
and Z = 0, we obtain the Wald estimator:
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]
= E[D(1)Y (1) + (1 − D(1))Y (0)|Z = 1] − E[D(0)Y (1) + (1 − D(0))Y (0)|Z = 0]
= E[(D(1) − D(0))(Y (1) − Y (0))] (2)
= Pr[D(1) − D(0) = 1]E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(1) − D(0) = 1] (3)
+ Pr[D(1) − D(0) = −1]E[Y (0) − Y (1)|D(1) − D(0) = −1].
Equation 2 follows from Assumption 1∗, and Assumption 2∗ ensures the Wald estimator is ﬁnite.
One causal parameter of interest is the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) eﬀect, which is the causal eﬀect
of treatment assignment on outcomes:
βITT ≡ E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]. (4)
The only assumptions necessary to identify the ITT eﬀect from the Wald estimator in Equation
3 are Assumptions 1∗ and 2∗. Under these assumptions, Equation 3 represents a comparison of
weighted average outcomes between those individuals who “switch-in” (compliers) and those who
“switch-out” (deﬁers) of treatment due to changes in assigned treatment. The outcomes of those
whose treatment is not aﬀected by assigned treatment, always-takers and never-takers, do not
contribute to this estimate.
3.1.2 A Brief Review of Program Eﬀect Estimates from MTO
The Intent-to-Treat (ITT) eﬀects identiﬁed in the literature on MTO compare the mean out-
comes of those oﬀered a housing voucher with the outcomes of households who were not oﬀered
a housing voucher. These parameters have a clear policy interpretation: they are the eﬀects on
outcomes from being oﬀered a housing voucher through the MTO program. And since the oﬀer of a
housing voucher (Z = 1, or assigned treatment) was randomly allocated to households, these eﬀects
should be interpreted as causal eﬀects. Based on the outcomes of Gautreaux, researchers expected to
ﬁnd universally positive eﬀects of moving through MTO (Kling et al. (2007a), Sanbonmatsu et al.
(2006)). In contrast to researchers’ expectations, the data show that the eﬀects of the program
were mixed.
There were no signiﬁcant eﬀects on earnings, welfare participation, or the amount of government
assistance adults received 5 years after randomization (Kling et al. (2007a)). There was also little
eﬀect on adult physical health: No statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on self-reported overall health,
hypertension, or asthma (Kling et al. (2007a)). The single improvement in adult outcomes - a
5 percentage point reduction in adult obesity for the experimental group relative to the control
group - cannot be distinguished from statistical aberration since there are multiple hypotheses
being tested simultaneously (Kling et al. (2007a)).
7However, there were positive ITT eﬀects on measures of adult mental health such as distress and
calmness (Tables III in Kling et al. (2007a) and F5 in Kling et al. (2007b)). In fact, the magnitude
of the improvements in adult mental health were comparable to the most eﬀective clinical and
pharmacological interventions (Kling et al. (2007a)). Kling et al. (2007a) hypothesize that this
improvement in mental health is due to a reduction in the fear of random violence. A related
outcome is that adults in the experimental group were much less likely to report that police do not
come when called in the neighborhood (Table II and p 102 of Kling et al. (2005)).
Improved outcomes for young females were found in the groups oﬀered a housing voucher
through MTO. For young females ages 15-25 in 2001 (4-7 years after randomization), Kling et al.
(2005) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of being assigned to the experimental group is about one-third fewer
arrests for violent and property crimes relative to the control group. Kling et al. (2007a) analyze
results from MTO youth aged 15-20 at all ﬁve sites an average of ﬁve years after random assignment.
They ﬁnd positive ITT eﬀects for female youth that are largest with respect to mental health and
still substantial for education and risky behavior (Kling et al. (2007a), Table G2 in Kling et al.
(2007b)).
MTO had negative ITT eﬀects on the outcomes of young males. The eﬀects on young males
were a deterioration in physical health and an increase in risky behavior, smoking and non-sports
injuries (Kling et al. (2007a)), as well as an increase in the fraction of days absent from school and
the probability of having a friend who uses drugs (Kling et al. (2005), Table IX). While Kling et al.
(2005) ﬁnd statistically insigniﬁcant changes in violent crime arrests, they also ﬁnd a positive ITT
eﬀect of about one-third of the control group mean for property crime arrests. After considering
empirical evidence on three reasons for these gender diﬀerences - peer sorting, coping strategies, and
a comparative advantage in property oﬀending - Kling et al. (2005) conclude that these outcomes
result from boys being more likely to take advantage of a newfound comparative advantage in prop-
erty oﬀending in their new neighborhoods.6 The dynamics of these behaviors are interesting, as
young males have signiﬁcantly lower violent crime arrests in the ﬁrst two years after random assign-
ment, but property crime rates then increase signiﬁcantly starting 3 and 4 years after assignment
(Kling et al. (2005), Table V).
Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) examine test score data collected in 2002 for MTO children who
were 6-20 on December 31, 2001 and ﬁnd no evidence of improvements in reading scores, math
scores, behavior problems, or school engagement. Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) ﬁrst combine reading
and math test scores (Woodcock-Johnson Revised scores) and estimate ITT eﬀects for all ages,
as well as by subgroups of 6-10, 11-14, and 15-20. The ITT eﬀects for the combined reading and
math scores are neither statistically signiﬁcant for any age subgroup nor for all ages together (p
673). When Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) examine ITT eﬀects for several other educational outcomes,
such as grade repetition, suspensions, measures of school engagement such tardiness and paying
6An interesting note from Kling et al. (2005) is that these eﬀects seem to be driven by the number of arrests for
those who are criminally involved, rather than the rate of participation in criminal activity (p 102). However, eﬀects
are similar for those with and without histories of anti-social behaviors prior to random assignment, such as arrest,
expulsion from school, or parents called to school for problems (p 112).
8attention in class, they ﬁnd only one ITT eﬀect to be statistically signiﬁcant: the eﬀect of being
oﬀered a voucher actually increases problem behaviors for youth aged 11-14 (p 673).
The only achievement test eﬀect for subgroups that is statistically signiﬁcant is a positive exper-
imental ITT on reading for African-American children (p 678). The positive impacts on test scores
were only found in Baltimore and Chicago (Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), p 678; Burdick-Will et al.
(2010)). These sites were almost entirely African-American (unlike the other sites, which had many
Hispanic households), and also had higher crime rates (Burdick-Will et al. (2010)).
3.2 Identiﬁcation of Neighborhood Eﬀects
3.2.1 Assigned Treatment and Selection into Treatment
In addition to using the results from MTO for studying the eﬀects of housing voucher programs,
researchers have also interpreted estimates of the eﬀects of moving through MTO as neighborhood
eﬀects. Since several of the parameters in the program evaluation literature relevant to this re-
search are deﬁned in terms of the subpopulation receiving treatment, we consider a model of how
individuals select into treatment. We begin by noting that it need not be true that D = Z, and
so we write D(Z) to denote the treatment received when assigned treatment Z. We next suppose
there is a latent index D∗ that depends on assigned treatment Z and some unobserved component
U∗ as follows:
D∗ =  ∗(Z) − U∗, (5)





1 if D∗ ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
(6)
We follow Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) and assume:
Assumption 1 Y (0), Y (1), and D(z) are jointly independent of Z
Assumption 2 E[Y (0)] < ∞ and E[Y (1)] < ∞
Assumption 3  ∗(Z) is a non-degenerate random variable
Assumption 4 U∗ ∼ U[0,1]
Note that there is no loss of generality for the selection model in Equations 5 and 6 by making
Assumptions 3 and 4. As noted in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), Assumptions 3 and 4 imply
that if D∗ = v(Z) − V , we may equate the two models by writing  ∗(Z) = FV (v(Z)) and U∗ =
FV (V (Z)).7 We write the propensity score as P(z) = Pr(D = 1|Z = z). Note that Assumption 4
7Applying the probability integral transformation is much less useful in the variable treatment intensity case
relative to the binary case presented here.
9implies  ∗(z) = P(z) when  ∗(z) ∈ [0,1]. In the discussion that follows,  ∗(z) and P(z) are used
interchangeably depending on which term better facilitates interpretation.
Table 1 shows how the labels in Angrist et al. (1996) apply to individuals due to their response
to treatment assignment. Figure 2 shows how these labels are generated by the selection model in
Equations 5 and 6, and we focus on the case displayed in Figure 2a. Note that since the unobservable
component of the latent index is distributed according to a uniform [0,1] distribution, U∗ ∼ U[0,1],
treatment does not depend on U∗ or Z if both  ∗(Z = 0) < 0 and  ∗(Z = 1) < 0, or if both
 ∗(Z = 0) ≥ 1 and  ∗(Z = 1) ≥ 1. Speciﬁcally, if  ∗(Z) < 0 for both Z = 0,1, then an individual
is a never-taker, while if  ∗(Z) ≥ 1 for both Z = 0,1, then an individual is an always-taker.
It is when  ∗(Z) ∈ (0,1) that treatment depends on both assigned treatment and the unobserved
component of the latent index, U∗. Consider the situation portrayed by D∗ =  ∗
1(Z)−U∗
1 in Figure
2a. In the case that 0 <  ∗
1(Z = 0) <  ∗
1(Z = 1) < 1, assigning treatment to an individual makes
them more likely to participate. Individuals with u∗ ∈ [0, ∗
1(Z = 0)) are always takers, those with
u∗ ∈ [ ∗
1(Z = 0), ∗
1(Z = 1)) are compliers, and those with u∗ ∈ [ ∗
1(Z = 1),1) are never-takers.8
Note that if D∗ =  ∗
1(Z) − U∗
1 for all individuals as in Figure 2a, then there are no deﬁers.9
Furthermore, if all individuals select into treatment according to D∗ =  ∗
1(Z) − U∗
1 and it is the
case that  ∗
1(Z = 0) ≤ 0 and  ∗
1(Z = 1) ∈ (0,1), then there are no always takers, only compliers
and never-takers. When D = 1 is deﬁned as use of a voucher oﬀered by the MTO program,
this is a reasonable way of modeling selection into treatment, as families could not have used a
voucher through the MTO program unless they were assigned a voucher through the MTO program.
However, under alternative deﬁnitions of D = 1, particularly those in which D = 1 is moving to
a neighborhood with a particular characteristic, assuming  ∗
1(Z = 0) ≤ 0 may be unreasonable.
Being able to say whether  ∗
i(Z = 0) < 0 or  ∗
i(Z = 0) ∈ (0,1) will depend on the deﬁnition of
treatment, which will in turn determine how we interpret parameter estimates.
Given our joint model of outcomes (Equation 1) and selection into treatment (Equations 5 and
6), we now consider the assumptions necessary to identify parameters of interest. We will use this
joint model to deﬁne and interpret these parameters.
3.2.2 The TOT and LATE
Researchers are often interested in how receiving treatment aﬀects outcomes. Since the ITT
parameter can only be interpreted as the eﬀect of assigning treatment to units/individuals, it is
uninformative to researchers on this topic. Thus there is interest in using Equation 3 to identify
8Throughout this paper the word complier will be deﬁned as in Angrist et al. (1996).
9In order for the selection model in Equations 5 and 6 to produce deﬁers, some subpopulation would have to







1(Z = 1) > µ
∗
1(Z = 0), while another subpopulation







2(Z = 1) < µ
∗
2(Z = 0). This could
be an example of essential heterogeneity as deﬁned in Heckman et al. (2006). Related examples include the way
parents select their children into the treatment of kindergarten entrance age (Aliprantis (2011)) and the way students
select into attaining a GED, graduating from high school, or dropping out of high school in response to easing
GED requirements (Heckman and Urz´ ua (2010)). The assumption of monotonicity introduced in Imbens and Angrist
(1994), and presented shortly in Assumption 5, rules out the possibility of deﬁers.
10treatment eﬀects that go beyond the ITT and inform us about the eﬀect of treatment on outcomes.10
Much of the literature on instrumental variables does this by placing restrictions on how changes
in the instrument induce changes in treatment (ie, on the selection model in Equations 5 and 6.).
In the case of a social experiment like MTO, the instrument is assigned treatment (Heckman
(1996)). Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist and Imbens (1995) develop several assumptions
made on the selection model in Equations 5 and 6 that allow for the identiﬁcation of treatment ef-
fects when combined with Assumptions 1–4. In the context of our selection model, the monotonicity
assumption introduced in Imbens and Angrist (1994) is:
Assumption 5a  ∗(Z = 0) <  ∗(Z = 1) for all individuals
Assumption 5b At least one of { ∗(Z = 0), ∗(Z = 1)} is in (0,1) for all individuals
Assumption 3 implies that  ∗(Z = 0)  =  ∗(Z = 1), and Assumption 5 ensures that being assigned
to treatment makes no individuals less likely to receive treatment, while at the same time ensuring
that some individuals are induced to receive treatment due to the instrument. That is, together
with Assumptions 1-4, Assumption 5 ensures that Pr[D(1)−D(0) = −1] = 0 and Pr[D(1)−D(0) =
1]  = 0, so the Wald estimator from Equation 3 identiﬁes
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) ≡ E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(1) − D(0) = 1] =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]
Pr[D(1) − D(0) = 1]
. (7)
The Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) is the average eﬀect of treatment on outcome Y for
those who can be induced to change treatment by a change in assigned treatment (ie, The LATE
informs us about the average eﬀect of treatment on compliers.).
The Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT) eﬀect is deﬁned as the average change in outcome for
those who are treated, or the average eﬀect of treatment over both compliers and always-takers. It
is possible for the researcher to identify this parameter if they believe there are no always-takers
(ie, that Pr[D(0) = 1] = 0). In the context of our selection model, we might assume:
Assumption 6  ∗(Z = 0) < 0 and  ∗(Z = 1) ∈ (0,1) for all individuals
Under Assumptions 1-4 and 6, the Wald estimator allows us to identify
βTOT ≡ E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(1) = 1] =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]
Pr[D(1) = 1]
. (8)
Remember that within our selection model the subgroups of compliers, always-takers, and never-
takers can be identiﬁed by the interval in which their realization of U∗ lies. Thus, as pointed out
in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), the TOT and LATE parameters can be seen as the average value
of Y (1) − Y (0) for U∗ lying in diﬀerent intervals. Under the selection model in Equations 5 and 6,
10To be clear, this paper refers to the treatment actually received by a unit as treatment and the treatment assigned
to a unit as assigned treatment.
11together with Assumptions 1-5, we have:
βTOT = E[Y (1) − Y (0) | 0 ≤ U∗ ≤  ∗(Z = 1)]
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) = E[Y (1) − Y (0) |  ∗(Z = 0) ≤ U∗ <  ∗(Z = 1)].
That is, βTOT is the average response to treatment for individuals with U∗ ∈ (0, ∗(Z = 1)), while
βLATE is the average response to treatment for individuals with U∗ ∈ ( ∗(Z = 0), ∗(Z = 1)).
Since U∗ ∈ [0,1], Assumption 6 implies there will be no always-takers and thus the LATE and
TOT parameters will be identical:
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) = E[Y (1) − Y (0) |  ∗(Z = 0) < 0 ≤ U∗ <  ∗(Z = 1)]
= βTOT.
3.2.3 The MTE and the Interpretation of the TOT and LATE
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) show that the TOT and LATE, in addition to several other treat-
ment eﬀects, may be deﬁned in terms of the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect (MTE). We consider some
of their results here to clarify the interpretation of TOT and LATE estimates. Given the latent
index model in Equation 6, we deﬁne the MTE as
βMTE(u) = E[Y (1) − Y (0)|U∗ = u].
Heckman et al. (2006) show that while Assumptions 1-4 are met and Pr(D = 1) ∈ (0,1) we can
interpret the MTE as the derivative of the expected value of the outcome at a particular level of
U∗, so that:





E[Y |P(Z) = x]dx
= E[Y |P(Z) = u′] +
  u′′
u′
E[Y (1) − Y (0)|P(Z) = x]dx.
Furthermore, the Mean Value Theorem tells us there exists some u⋆ ∈ (u′,u′′) such that:
E[Y |P(Z) = u′′] − E[Y |P(Z) = u′]
u′′ − u′ = E[Y (1) − Y (0)|P(Z) = u⋆].
If we let P(Z = 1) = u′′ and P(Z = 0) = u′, then under Assumptions 1-5 we can think of the LATE
as the MTE evaluated at that individual for which the MTE is equal to the average MTE over the
interval in question. The TOT is the limiting case of the LATE parameter as P(0) = u′ ↓ 0.
βMTE(u) is the mean response to treatment for persons with U∗ = u, and the previous discussion
illustrates that the LATE is the average value of βMTE(u) for persons with u lying in some interval
(u′,u′′). An important point is that the interval over which the LATE is identiﬁed is determined by
the values of  (Z), with (u′,u′′) = (P(Z = 0),P(Z = 1)). Further discussion of these parameters
12may be found in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), Heckman (2010),
Angrist et al. (1996), and Imbens and Angrist (1994).
3.2.4 Two Hypothetical Examples in the Context of MTO
Now consider a hypothetical example from MTO in which the outcome of interest Y is hours
worked per week. Figure 3 illustrates this example under two possible deﬁnitions of treatment to
clarify the interpretation of the treatment eﬀects just discussed. Look ﬁrst at the treatment eﬀects
in Example 1. This example shows that because the LATE allows for heterogeneity in response to
treatment in a general way, the LATEs for individuals with u in diﬀerent intervals can be dramat-
ically diﬀerent. We see that while βLATE(0.1,0.6) and βLATE(0.6,0.9) are of similar magnitudes
in this example, they are of opposite signs. And although E[Y |P(Z) = 0.3] is approximately the
same as E[Y |P(Z) = 0.6], the magnitudes of βLATE(0.1,0.3) and βLATE(0.1,0.6) are quite dif-
ferent because the second LATE is an average over a much larger share of individuals. In this
example treatment has a large positive eﬀect on hours worked per week on those individuals most
likely to select into treatment, those with small values of u, and this eﬀect decreases to the point
of becoming negative for those diﬃcult to induce into treatment, those with large values of u.
Now consider Example 2. Since the LATE framework allows for general heterogeneity in
response to treatment, we need not know a priori whether the function E[Y |P(Z) = p] looks
like it does in Example 1 or Example 2. It could be the case that βLATE(0.1,0.3) = 45 and
βLATE(0.6,0.9) = −24 as in Example 1, or it could be the case that βLATE(0.1,0.3) = 1 and
βLATE(0.6,0.9) = 42 as in Example 2. Knowledge of one LATE for individuals with U∗ in a given
interval need not be informative about the LATE for individuals in any other interval. Further-
more, it is highly unlikely that we get to choose the interval of U∗ realizations to which a LATE
pertains. In the case of MTO, the intervals are determined by the share of households selecting
into treatment in both the experimental and control groups. Example 2 also helps to highlight
the diﬀerence between the TOT and LATE. Suppose there is a large share of always-takers, all
those with u ∈ (0,0.6). Then the average eﬀect on compliers (the LATE) could be dramatically
larger than the average eﬀect on always-taker and compliers together (the TOT). This is because
in Example 2 treatment only has a small eﬀects on hours worked for those with low values of u,
those most likely to select into treatment, but has eﬀects that become quite large for those with
high values of u, those least likely to select into treatment.
These examples help to show how important selection into treatment is for interpreting LATE
estimates. A given instrument such as experimental group status in MTO only identiﬁes one LATE
for a given deﬁnition of treatment. A complete understanding of the eﬀects of a given treatment
in our framework would require knowledge of the MTE at all values of U∗, yet a given LATE
only informs us about the average MTE for individuals in a speciﬁc interval (u′,u′′), which is it-
self determined by how households select into treatment. In the case of MTO, LATE parameters
are the eﬀects of moves to neighborhoods with particular characteristics induced by MTO. Other
instruments would likely have induced other subpopulations to select into the deﬁned neighbor-
13hood treatment, and thus would almost certainly yield diﬀerent LATEs for a given deﬁnition of
treatment. For example, although only about 20% of families participating in Gautreaux moved
through the program, its alternative rules for moving likely induced a greater share of compliers for
many neighborhood treatments than did MTO, despite the fact that approximately 47% of exper-
imental families moved through the program (Ludwig et al. (2008)). Alternative housing mobility
programs designed to induce moves to diﬀerent types of neighborhoods could plausibly result in
diﬀerent neighborhood eﬀects. Thus while we may estimate neighborhood eﬀects from MTO, even
an experiment such as MTO can only inform us about a small subset of the neighborhood eﬀects
of interest within our framework.
3.3 Program Eﬀects Versus Neighborhood Eﬀects from MTO
The interpretation of results from MTO as neighborhood eﬀects has created controversy among
social scientists. One interpretation argues that selection into treatment biases parameter estimates
(Clampet-Lundquist and Massey (2008)). An opposing interpretation is that randomization makes
selection unimportant for the estimation and interpretation of treatment eﬀects from MTO. A quote
from Ludwig et al. (2008) summarizes this view: “Randomization ... solves the selection problem,
by causing variation in neighborhood of residence to occur for reasons that are uncorrelated with
individual characteristics, whether or not those characteristics are measurable.”11
The preceding discussion of the LATE helps to reconcile these opposing views. Note that “The
critical feature of the problem of evaluating a treatment under imperfect compliance is that even if
assignment Zi is random or ignorable, the actual receipt of treatment Di is typically nonignorable
[or nonrandom]” (Angrist et al. (1996), p 447). Therefore the selection model in Section 3 is
appropriate for evaluating results from MTO. Randomization occurred in MTO at the level of
assigned treatment (Z ∈ {0,1}), not at the level of treatment (D ∈ {0,1}). Households were able
to choose whether or not to move, and where to move to, after receiving their assigned treatment.
While it is true that randomization in MTO did indeed induce variation in neighborhood of
residence that was uncorrelated with individual characteristics, our model of selection helps us to
see that this statement is only true within the subgroup of compliers. This point does not impact
the current interpretation of program eﬀect estimates found in the literature. One set of such eﬀects
are ITT eﬀects for which treatment is deﬁned as “being oﬀered a housing voucher through MTO.”
Another set of program eﬀects are TOT parameters for which treatment is deﬁned as “moving
through the MTO program.” Since no one can move through the MTO program unless assigned
treatment, there are no always-takers of this treatment, and thus the TOT and LATE parameters
are identical. These TOT eﬀects are all qualitatively similar to the ITT eﬀects reviewed earlier.12
11This view is shared by most of the inﬂuential articles on MTO, including Kling et al. (2007a), Kling et al. (2005),
Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), Ludwig (2010), and even Sampson (2008).
12The TOT eﬀects have a slightly larger magnitude since they are the ITT eﬀects divided by the probability of
receiving treatment, which in this case is estimated in Table F9 of Kling et al. (2007b) to be 0.467. For example, the
TOT eﬀect of this treatment was a 10 percentage point decrease in adult obesity, compared with an ITT eﬀect of a
5 percentage point decrease (Kling et al. (2007a)).
14On the other hand, exogenous variation in neighborhood of residence being restricted to the
subgroup of compliers will have major implications if we are interested in learning about the eﬀects
of speciﬁc neighborhood characteristics on outcomes. If treatment were deﬁned to be “moving
to a neighborhood with characteristic x,” where x were low poverty, high employment, or a high
degree of personal safety, then there would be always-takers, and the TOT and LATE parameters
would no longer be the same. As discussed in Section 3.2.4, LATE estimates may not only diﬀer
dramatically in magnitude from ITT or TOT estimates, but their interpretation may also be quite
diﬀerent from that of the ITT and TOT estimates found in the literature. Using LATEs to assess
the evidence on neighborhood eﬀects from MTO will likely lead to diﬀerent conclusions than using
ITT or TOT eﬀects for the same purpose.
4 Data
The primary source of data is the MTO Interim Evaluation sample. In addition to information
on the MTO sample collected both at the time members volunteered to participate and during
MTO participation, the Interim Evaluation data also contain information on the MTO sample in
2002, the time the evaluation was conducted. Each individual was linked to their household in two
ways, and these deﬁnitions are necessary for deﬁning the two types of individuals in this sample
whose outcomes we will investigate. The base household members were those individuals living
together at the baseline, or the period before random assignment, and the core household members
were those individuals planning to move together if awarded a voucher. For adult outcomes we
consider the outcomes of adult females who are core household members. For youth outcomes we
consider children between the ages of 5 and 19 as of May 31, 2001. Up to two such children from
each core household were included in the sample, and in households with more than two children,
two children were randomly selected.
The MTO Interim Evaluation data contain some variables about the census tracts in which
participants resided that will be used to understand neighborhood characteristics. A secondary
source of data on neighborhood characteristics used in the analysis is decennial census data from
the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS, Minnesotra Population Center
(2004)). Tract-level variables from these data are matched to the MTO Interim Evaluation sample
to supplement the variables related to neighborhood characteristics that are available in the Interim
Evaluation data.
4.1 Variables
Some treatments are deﬁned in terms of neighborhood characteristics, which are measured at
the level of census tracts. When available, tract-level variables from the MTO Interim Evalua-
tion are used before using the matched tract-level variables from the NHGIS census data. The
Interim Evaluation has variables reporting the 2000 census data for the census tracts in which core
households lived in 2002. These variables used in the analysis include poverty rate and percent
15minority. The sample also lists the census tract in which core households lived in 2002, and this
information is linked to NHGIS variables from the 2000 census. The variables created in this way
include the female high school graduation rate, the female BA attainment rate, the female labor
force participation rate, the percent of females employed in a management, professional, or related
occupation, the percent of households receiving public assistance income in 1999, and the share of
households with own-children under the age of 18 that are single-headed.
Supplementing these census data are variables obtained by directly asking respondents about
their neighborhood of residence in 2002. These variables include whether the respondent feels safe
in the current neighborhood at night, whether there is a problem with police not responding when
called to the neighborhood, and whether the respondent believes it is likely or very likely that
neighbors would do something about children spray-painting graﬃti or skipping school.
In addition to these neighborhood characteristics, many children’s treatments are deﬁned in
terms of schools or peer groups. One set of school variables are constructed as weighted averages
of characteristics of all schools attended by the child using administrative data; these include the
percentile rank on state assessments and the student-teacher ratio. Another set of school variables
are children’s responses to questions about the most recent school they have attended. These
questions include whether the child agrees or strongly agrees that they feel safe in school, whether
the child agrees or strongly agrees that teachers are interested in students, whether the school
has discipline or disruption problems, and how the child rates the overall school climate using ﬁve
subquestions. There are also variables on the child’s peer group, which include whether they have
any friends who use drugs or carry a weapon, and whether they live in the same neighborhood as
at the baseline or visit with friends from that neighborhood.
The labor market outcomes of adults are variables measuring the self-reported total earnings of
the head of household, the total household income (all sources summed), the individual earnings in
2001 of the sample adult, the labor market status of the adult at the time of the interim survey (ie,
Whether they are employed, unemployed, or not in the labor force at all.), and a binary variable in-
dicating whether an adult respondent or her children have received welfare beneﬁts (AFDC/TANF)
at any time during the past two years. Adult health outcomes used are a psychological distress
index for the adult respondent that is the fraction of six psychological distress items that the adult
reported feeling at least some of the time during the past month, the adult’s Body Mass Index
(BMI), and whether the adult reported symptoms of depression during the past year.
Youth outcomes used include problem behaviors, such as whether a child has ever smoked a
cigarette, ever smoked pot, ever drunk alcohol, or ever been arrested. The measure of education
and labor market outcomes is a binary variable indicating whether a child was idle during the past
week, where idle is deﬁned as neither being in school nor being employed. Health outcomes of youth
include whether the child reports having an asthma attack or wheezing in the past year, the BMI
percentile of the youth, whether the youth has ever had depression symptoms, and a psychological
distress index for children that is the fraction of the six psychological distress items the child
reported feeling at least some of the time during the 30 days prior to the interim survey. Test
16score data are not used in examining youth outcomes for three reasons. First, careful analysis has
already been done of these data (Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), Burdick-Will et al. (2010)). Second,
there are some surprising patterns in these data that are diﬃcult to explain, such as the fact that
MTO children scored higher on tests than one would predict from their demographic characteristics
(See Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), p 659.). And most importantly, MTO only induced small changes
in school quality. This variation will be examined closely in Section 5.2.
4.2 Weights
Weights are used in all estimates for two reasons. First, random assignment ratios varied both
from site to site and over diﬀerent time periods of sample recruitment. Randomization ratio weights
are used to create samples representing the same number of people across groups within each site-
period. This ensures neighborhood eﬀects are not conﬂated with time trends. Second, sampling
weights must be used to account for the sub-sampling procedures used during the interim evaluation
data collection.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics at Baseline
The MTO Interim Evaluation sample used in this analysis includes 4,156 adult females and
6,683 children. Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of this adult sample at the baseline. At
baseline 38% of adults reported having completed high school, and an additional 19% reported
having completed a GED. 25% of adult respondents were working for pay, and 75% were receiving
AFDC/TANF beneﬁts. 50% reported that the streets near their home were very unsafe at night,
and 42% report that during the 6 months preceding the survey, a household member had been
beaten/assaulted; threatened with a gun or knife; or had their purse, wallet, or jewelry snatched
from them. Only 16% of adult respondents owned a car, and 42% had previously applied for a
Section 8 housing voucher. The median adult age was 32 years.
5 Neighborhood Eﬀects from MTO
We estimate LATE parameters using a Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) regression in which
the ﬁrst stage is:
D = Zγ + η, (9)
and the second stage is:
Y =   DβLATE + ǫ. (10)
In these equations Y is the outcome of interest, D is a binary variable indicating receipt of a
neighborhood treatment, and Z is experimental group status.
175.1 Deﬁning Treatment
Many neighborhood characteristics are naturally deﬁned as binary variables, and thus may be
used as the treatment variable in the evaluation framework presented in Section 3. For example,
one might be interested in whether residents believe a neighborhood is safe at night, or whether
a child moves to a “good” school according to some criterion. But it is necessary to dichotomize
a continuous treatment for it to ﬁt into the evaluation framework in Section 3, which may cause
Assumption 1 to fail to hold. Consider the example in which treatment is deﬁned as moving to a
neighborhood with a 20% poverty rate or less. A household that would move to a neighborhood
with a poverty rate of 18% when not assigned treatment would be an always-taker under this
deﬁnition of treatment. It is possible that such a household would be induced to move into a
neighborhood with a lower poverty rate, say 10%, after being assigned treatment. However, given
our binary deﬁnition of treatment, in this scenario the household would still be an always-taker.
It might be the case that Y (0) is not independent of Z if changes in treatment intensity across
margins other than those deﬁning the binary treatment aﬀect outcomes.
The example of poverty rate shows a drawback of dichotomizing continuous treatments. On
the other hand, deﬁning treatment in such a way does help to focus attention on those margins of
treatment believed to be important. We now consider three variables to help illustrate this point
We ﬁrst investigate the consequences of dichotomizing a continuous measure of school quality.
Consider the percentile ranking on test scores of schools in Chicago as illustrated in Table 5. With a
ﬁrst-stage F-statistic across all sites of 13, experimental group assignment is a strong instrument for
school ranking if we use a continuous measure of school ranking. One line up in Table 5, however,
shows that experimental group status becomes a weak instrument if we deﬁne school ranking as a
binary variable indicating whether a child attended a school above or below the median school in
their state.
Figure 14c shows the underlying distributions generating these statistics, and illustrates why
dichotomizing a continuous treatment into a binary treatment can be a useful exercise. These
CDFs show, ﬁrst of all, that children in both the control and experimental groups attended the
worst schools in Chicago. There is very little diﬀerence in the distributions of the control and
experimental MTO youth up to their 60th percentiles. Between the 60th and 99th percentiles
there is some diﬀerence in the distributions, but focusing on the vertical distance between the two
CDFs, we see that most of this diﬀerence comes from moving children across margins near the 20th
percentile school. It seems reasonable to assume the eﬀects of moving MTO children to a school
above the 20th percentile are negligible relative to moving children from this same population to a
school above the median.
Another neighborhood characteristic measured continuously is the high school graduation rate
of females within a census tract. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the US population in 2000
by the high school graduation rate of females over 25 in their census tract. The 10th percentile
person lived in a neighborhood with a female high school graduation rate of 61.6 percent, and the
graduation rates in the neighborhood of the 25th and 50th percentile individuals were, respectively,
1873.2 and 83.2 percent.13
The national distribution in Figure 4 helps to put the MTO results in Figure 10 in context.
Consider speciﬁcally Figure 10d, the distributions of the MTO treatment and experimental groups
in Los Angeles. We can ﬁrst see that the vast majority in the MTO control group lives in a
neighborhood below the 10th percentile of the national distribution, which contrasts with Boston
and Chicago. The next feature of Figure 10d we might notice is that MTO induced a large change
in the experimental group distribution. We see a large area between the control and experimental
CDFs, but most of this diﬀerence is between graduation rates of 35 and 75 percent. Moving people
from a neighborhood with a graduation rate of 35 percent to a neighborhood with a 60 percent
graduation rate moves them from a neighborhood extremely far in the left tail of the national
distribution to a neighborhood that is still far in the left tail of the distribution. We see a much
smaller vertical distance between the distributions when we look at the median graduation rate
of 82.5. Thus Figure 10d indicates that MTO induced many families to move to neighborhoods
with higher female high school graduation rates, but also that most of these changes took place
somewhere in the long left tail of the national distribution.
The third continuous neighborhood characteristic we will consider is the share of households with
own children under 18 that were single-headed. Figure 9 shows the MTO control and experimental
distributions by site, and Figure 5 shows the national distribution. We can see in the ﬁgures that
nearly all of the changes in the MTO experimental distribution took place to the right of the 75th
percentile of the national distribution, 34.9%. In Baltimore, Chicago, and New York the majority
of changes took place to the right of the 90th percentile of the national distribution, 48.6%, and in
Boston and Los Angeles it was still the case that many of the changes were to the right of the 90th
percentile. Similar to the two other continuous characteristics we have examined here, most of the
changes in the share of single-headed households in a neighborhood that took place due to MTO
are to be found far in the tail of the national distribution.
Looking at these distributions begs the natural question: What types of moves characterize
a “strong” intervention? Reasonable people might disagree about what types of neighborhood
characteristics are feasible targets for housing mobility programs. Such people might also disagree
about what types of changes in neighborhood characteristics would be necessary to have large
eﬀects on individuals’ outcomes. Together with the evaluation framework reviewed in this paper,
the preceding discussion gives a constructive way to think about the consequences of adopting
alternative deﬁnitions of a strong intervention.
Now consider how a dichotomized treatment ﬁts into our evaluation framework by examining
the experimentally induced variation in continuous neighborhood and school characteristics shown
in Figures 7-17. These ﬁgures show the CDFs of continuous characteristics such as poverty rate,
the rate of educational attainment, the labor force participation rate, and the student/teacher
ratio. The vertical distance between the CDFs is the share of participants who were induced across
13The line in the ﬁgure is the graduation rate in the median census tract, not of the census tract in which the
median resident lived. The median census tract line is shown in the ﬁgure because this is the cutoﬀ used to deﬁne
the binary treatments.
19that margin due to the experiment. So for a binary treatment deﬁned as inducing moves across
a speciﬁc cutoﬀ of each of these variables, the share of compliers is the vertical distance between
the experimental and control CDFs. For example, Figure 7 shows that if we deﬁne treatment as
moving to a neighborhood with a poverty rate of 20% or less, then 25.0% of residents in New York
City were compliers. If we deﬁne treatment as moving to a neighborhood with a poverty rate of
10% or less, then 9.7% New York City residents were compliers.
When dichotomizing a continuous variable, the researcher is choosing a cutoﬀ to classify those
neighborhood characteristics qualifying as a neighborhood treatment. To come as close as possible
to meeting Assumption 1, this cutoﬀ should be chosen to deﬁne the margin across which moving
will result in the largest eﬀects. However, this goal must be balanced against choosing treatments
the researcher might reasonably expect to observe. In order to balance these goals, the analysis in
this paper deﬁnes high and low poverty and segregation in terms of MTO and Gautreaux program
guidelines. The remaining neighborhood treatments are deﬁned in terms of the median of all
US census tracts. Using the median census tract to deﬁne neighborhood treatments is meant to
represent moves to neighborhoods that are “good” along the dimension under consideration.
5.2 Treatments and Instrument Strength
Given binary neighborhood treatments deﬁned in the previous section, we now investigate how
strong of an instrument experimental group status in MTO was for inducing households into those
treatments at the various MTO sites. This is a useful exercise because it recasts one controversy
in the literature on MTO, which can be viewed as a debate regarding whether experimental group
assignment was a weak instrument for various neighborhood treatments.14
We ﬁrst gauge instrument strength visually by looking at Figures 7-13. One measure of the
strength of the MTO intervention is the total area between the CDFs of the control and experimental
groups. The measure we will use under our deﬁnition of neighborhood treatments is the share of
compliers, which can be determined by looking at the vertical distance between the CDFs at the
vertical lines in these ﬁgures, which represent either the program cutoﬀ or median census tract
characteristic in 2000 used to deﬁne treatment.
Using this visual criterion, we can ﬁrst see that the largest changes in neighborhood charac-
teristics due to the MTO intervention were related to the neighborhood poverty rate (Figure 7).
The next largest changes were in the neighborhood female labor force participation rate (Figure
11). The other ﬁgures show remarkably little variation induced by MTO in many of the neighbor-
hood characteristics believed to inﬂuence outcomes, including segregation, share of single-headed
households, educational attainment, and the share of residents receiving public assistance income.
Figures 14-16 show there was remarkably little diﬀerence between the experimental and control
14Another approach would be to simply proceed in estimating LATE parameters using data from all of the sites,
and then to make inference using tests whose properties have been established for arbitrarily weak instruments
(Moreira (2009), Andrews et al. (2006)). But the analysis in this paper aims to paint a descriptive picture about the
sign and magnitudes of various neighborhood eﬀects rather than testing any speciﬁc hypothesis. As a result we are
still concerned with the bias caused by weak instruments (Bound et al. (1995)).
20groups in several measures of school quality. For example, essentially no children attended schools
ranked above the median on statewide standardized exams, and thus only a very tiny minority
of students could have been induced across this margin of school quality due to the experiment.
Examining Figures 14 and 15, it appears that larger changes in class size and test score ranking were
induced by Gautreaux than by MTO (Pages 131 and 162 of Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum (2000),
respectively.).
Looking at the interventions by site rather than only by treatment, Figures 7-16 indicate that
Boston, Los Angeles, and New York were the strongest interventions, and that Baltimore and
Chicago were much weaker interventions.
We now follow a common practice in the literature for assessing the strength of an instrument
and examine the F-statistic on the excluded instrument in the ﬁrst-stage regression (Bound et al.
(1995)). Tables 3 and 5 show the F-statistics of the excluded instrument (assigned treatment)
in the ﬁrst-stage regression (Equation 9) using several deﬁnitions of treatment (D). We will use
these F-statistics to make formal statements about the experimentally-induced variation shown in
Figures 7-16. We will call assigned treatment a weak instrument for treatment at a particular site
if the F-statistic from the regression of treatment on assigned treatment is less than 10, a rule of
thumb established in Staiger and Stock (1997) and used widely in the literature.15
First looking at adults, the results in Table 3 indicate that being assigned to the experimental
group versus the control group is a very strong instrument for moving with an MTO voucher.
However, these tables also show that the MTO intervention was, remarkably, a weak instrument
at many sites for inducing changes in many of the other neighborhood characteristics believed to
inﬂuence outcomes. At only one site each was experimental group status a strong instrument for
moving to a neighborhood with a high rate of female high school graduates or BA holders, moving
to a neighborhood in which a large share of employed females were employed in a high status
occupation, moving to a neighborhood with low household rates of public assistance income, or
moving to a neighborhood where police come when called. At no site was experimental group
status a strong instrument for moving to an integrated neighborhood or moving to a neighborhood
with a low rate of single-headed households. These data provide evidence against the idea that the
neighborhood poverty rate is an adequate proxy for all of the neighborhood characteristics believed
to inﬂuence outcomes.16
In addition to moving with an MTO voucher, experimental group status was also a strong
instrument for moving to neighborhoods with low poverty, moving to neighborhoods with high
female labor force participation rates, and moving to neighborhoods residents felt were safe at
night. Experimental group status was a strong instrument for each of these treatments at either
three or four sites, and these are the neighborhood treatments whose eﬀects on adults will be
estimated. Estimation will only use those sites at which experimental group status was judged to
be a strong instrument for the neighborhood treatment under consideration.
15Although this need not be the only criterion used to determine the strength of an instrument (Cruz and Moreira
(2005)), it is a rule of thumb widely used in the literature.
16In other words, this is evidence against the linear index assumption made in Kling et al. (2007a).
21Looking at youth outcomes, Table 5 shows that being assigned to the experimental group is a
weak instrument for understanding the eﬀects of attending better schools in terms of standardized
test scores, student/teacher ratios, time spent on homework, or several other measures of school
quality. This is particularly striking because school quality can be considered an important measure
of neighborhood quality for households with school-age children due to the way schools are ﬁnanced
in the US. We can also see in Table 5 that experimental group status was not a strong instrument
for the collective eﬃcacy in a youth’s neighborhood, or for changing whether a youth had friends
in their old neighborhood or whether members of their peer groups use drugs or carry weapons.
Aside from poverty, neighborhood safety is the only other neighborhood or school characteristic
for which experimental group status in MTO was a strong instrument at more than one site, an
important point when considering LATE estimates on youth outcomes.
Although these results on instrument strength do not call into question any of the program
eﬀects obtained from the MTO data, Tables 3 and 5 do suggest that with the exception of poverty
rate, the results from MTO are far from ideal evidence on causal eﬀects of many of the neighborhood
characteristics commonly suspected of inﬂuencing outcomes.
5.3 Assumption 1
Before proceeding to the estimation results, we ﬁrst consider two possible violations of Assump-
tion 1. The ﬁrst violation comes from deﬁning treatment in a binary way, and was discussed in
depth in Section 5.1. Although the beneﬁt of dichotomizing continuous treatments is forcing the
researcher to deﬁne the margin at which they believe there will be the largest eﬀects, it is not clear
whether this beneﬁt is outweighed by the potential violations of Assumption 1 it creates. This issue
must be kept in mind when interpreting estimates. One way of addressing this issue is to deﬁne
a variable intensity treatment rather than a binary treatment. Angrist and Imbens (1995) intro-
duced a parameter that generalizes the LATE parameter to such a case where there is a discrete,
multi-valued treatment, and Heckman et al. (2006) further develop this Average Causal Response
(ACR) parameter within an ordered choice framework. However, while both of these frameworks
could possibly be fruitful avenues for future research, both have strong limitations and will not be
used here.17
The second possible violation of Assumption 1 comes from the fact that MTO changed a bundle
of neighborhood characteristics. This violation can be seen by supposing that treatment D is
deﬁned in terms of the neighborhood poverty rate, but the outcome in question Y is also aﬀected
by neighborhood safety. If experimental group status Z induces changes in both neighborhood
poverty rates and neighborhood safety, then it is likely that Y (1) and Y (0) will not be independent
of Z.
Despite this violation of Assumption 1, we proceed with our identiﬁcation strategy because
it is diﬃcult to imagine an instrumental variable identiﬁcation scheme in which Assumption
17The key limitation of the Angrist and Imbens (1995) framework is the ability to interpret estimated parameters.
Heckman et al. (2006) trade this limitation in favor of strong assumptions on the selection process.
221 is not violated. As one example, consider the well-known instrument originally proposed in
Angrist and Krueger (1991), date of birth combined with compulsory schooling laws to instrument
for educational attainment at a given age. Changing one’s birth date changes the age at which
one is eligible to drop out of school, and therefore induces variation in educational attainment at a
given age. However, changing date of birth also changes the absolute age at which children enter
school and their age relative to their classmates. It is diﬃcult to say how large these eﬀects are
relative to the eﬀects of attainment. But it is clear that this instrument changes multiple variables
that are all likely to causally eﬀect outcomes, creating a similar violation of Assumption 1.18
It is diﬃcult to imagine an instrumental variable that induces changes in only one causal variable
rather than a group of variables that causally eﬀect the outcome of interest. This violation of
Assumption 1 illustrates the limitations of focusing on exogenous variation in one causal variable
when there are many variables causally eﬀecting the outcome. Interpretation can be diﬃcult when
focusing on “the” eﬀect of one causal variable while abstracting from the eﬀects of other causal
variables and their interactions.
5.4 Estimation Results
LATEs are estimated using data only from those sites at which assigned treatment is considered
to be a strong instrument for the speciﬁc treatment under consideration, and only if experimental
group status was a strong instrument at more than one site. Table 6 shows LATE estimates for adult
outcomes. We see large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on labor force participation rates for all
deﬁnitions of treatment in the table. There are corresponding increases in both the employment and
unemployment rates, but only the eﬀects of poverty on unemployment are statistically signiﬁcant.
A low neighborhood poverty rate, a high degree of neighborhood safety, and a high female labor
force participation rate all have positive eﬀects on income and negative eﬀects on welfare beneﬁts.
Although these eﬀects are of the expected sign, and many are economically signiﬁcant, they are
very imprecisely estimated. Only the eﬀect of moving to a safe neighborhood on the household
head’s income is estimated precisely enough to be statistically signiﬁcant.
The LATEs of neighborhood poverty rate on health are almost all statistically signiﬁcant. And
while only one of the LATEs of neighborhood safety and female labor force participation rate on
health is statistically signiﬁcant, the remaining eﬀects are all of the expected sign. These eﬀects
are not too far from being statistically signiﬁcant, and taken together they point to economically
signiﬁcant eﬀects on health outcomes.
The share of compliers for the estimated LATEs is 21.8 percent of adults who moved from
neighborhoods with poverty rates higher than 20 percent to neighborhoods with poverty rates below
20 percent, and an analogous 12.0 percent of adults who moved across the 10 percent margin. For
neighborhood safety and female labor force participation the share of compliers is, respectively,
18This is ignoring other criticisms of this identiﬁcation scheme caused by redshirting (Aliprantis (2011)), the
non-random nature of birth date (Bound and Jaeger (2000)), and the weak correlation between date of birth and
educational attainment (Bound et al. (1995)).
2318.1 and 17.9 percent. Only neighborhood safety has a high share of always-takers; all of the other
treatments have shares of always-takers under 15 percent, with the share for poverty rate less than
10 percent only 3.5 percent. Thus the share of compliers tends to be high relative to the share
of always-takers, but also indicates the estimated LATEs are the average neighborhood eﬀects on
between 12.0 and 21.8 percent of the MTO sample.
The low share of always takers helps to illustrate how far in the tails of the national distributions
were the neighborhood characteristics of the census tracts in which most MTO families were living.
Of the entire nation’s population, 81.5 and 52.9 percent lived in neighborhoods with less than
20 or 10 percent poverty rates, respectively, in 2000 (Figure 6). This compares with shares of
always-takers at the sites used in estimation of only 14.5 and 3.5 percent, respectively.
Since MTO did not induce large changes in school quality along several measures, for youth
outcomes we consider estimates of eﬀects from neighborhood characteristics alone. Table 7 reports
estimates of eﬀects on youth outcomes related to problem behaviors, school outcomes, and health
from moving to a low poverty neighborhood or a safe neighborhood. Nearly all of the estimates
have very large standard errors and are thus diﬃcult to interpret. One possible explanation is that
these large standard errors are driven by heterogeneity in treatment eﬀects. Since the literature
shows strong heterogeneity in program eﬀects on youth by gender, Table 8 shows a subset of LATE
estimates for youth outcomes by gender. Although these estimates also have large standard errors,
they are indicative of heterogeneity in youth LATEs by gender.
Very few of the eﬀects on youth outcomes in Tables 7 and 8 are statistically diﬀerent from zero,
and there are two explanations for this. The ﬁrst is that changes to neighborhood characteristics
alone are not enough to eﬀect outcomes if they are not also combined with improvements to school
quality. This explanation is consistent with previous ﬁndings in the literature (Oreopoulos (2003)),
and need not preclude the possibility that schools alone or schools together with neighborhoods
or social programs (Dobbie and Fryer (2011)) can have large eﬀects on youth outcomes. A second
explanation is that changes in neighborhood characteristics eﬀect girls and boys diﬀerently. Both
of these explanations merit further attention, but the lack of improvement in school quality must
be the leading explanation for the absence of strong eﬀects on youth outcomes from MTO.
In addition to the results on instrument strength presented in Section 5.2, the diﬀerence in mag-
nitudes between LATE and ITT and TOT estimates could help to resolve some of the controversy
in the literature about the appropriate interpretation of the results from MTO. For example, the
LATEs on employment range from 10 to 29 percentage points in Table 6, which contrast strongly
with the ITT and TOT estimates of 1.5 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively, reported in Table
F3 of Kling et al. (2007b). Similarly, the LATEs of moving to a safe neighborhood are $4,743 for
earnings in 2001 and $6,156 for household head’s income, compared with ITT and TOT estimates
on earnings in 2001, respectively, of –$287 and –$612 as reported in Table F4 of Kling et al. (2007b).
These results suggest neighborhood eﬀects are of a larger magnitude than the program eﬀects from
MTO.
246 Discussion
6.1 Site Heterogeneity and the Design of Housing Mobility Programs
Complementing the data considered in Section 5.2, Tables 10 and 11 show large diﬀerences
in control means and program eﬀects across sites.19 Since investigation of this heterogeneity in
program eﬀects from MTO could be a fruitful avenue for improving both our understanding of
neighborhood eﬀects and the design of future housing mobility programs, some speculative hy-
potheses for explaining diﬀerences across sites are considered here.
We can see from Table 10 that positive adult labor market outcomes are driven by the eﬀects
in New York. The positive program eﬀects on labor market outcomes in New York could be
driven by the fact that income was lowest there, as were employment and labor force participation
rates. These eﬀects could also be driven by the fact New York and Los Angeles had the least safe
neighborhoods as judged by participants, and these sites also had the largest increases in safety due
to the program. Transportation could also help to explain diﬀerences across sites. Car ownership
was an important issue for Gautreaux movers (Polikoﬀ (2006), p 222), and New York’s public
transportation could give residents an advantage in accessing local labor markets. Another feature
of New York’s implementation of MTO is that it was the one site at which none of the participants
lived in public housing that was a part of HOPE VI.
A ﬁnal suspicion is that the positive labor market results in New York were driven by the
high share of hispanic participants at that site, but this was not the case. Estimated ITT eﬀects
(standard errors) on household head’s total income, employment, and labor force participation rate
for blacks in New York City are 3,799 (1,332), 0.11 (0.06), and 0.16 (0.06). These ITT eﬀects for
non-black participants in New York City are 1,914 (1,087), 0.10 (0.06), and 0.05 (0.06).
The program eﬀects in Baltimore compare unfavorably with those from the other sites, and racial
segregation is one possible explanation for these outcomes. Consider ﬁrst Figure 18 and Table 9,
which show decennial census data from the NHGIS indicating that African Americans living in
MTO cities in 1990 were dramatically more segregated from whites than other minority groups.
Table 9 and Figures 19a and 19c show that this diﬀerence was most pronounced in Baltimore and
Chicago, the sites at which MTO participants were almost entirely African American (Table 10),
and also the sites with the weakest interventions as discussed in Section 5.2. The median black
person in Baltimore and Chicago lived in a neighborhood almost completely devoid of any whites
in 1990. Figure 19 illustrates there are large shares of African Americans in the other MTO sites
who also lived in neighborhoods with extremely few whites even in 1990. Figure 8 conﬁrms that
MTO participants in both the experimental and control groups were those living in such highly
segregated neighborhoods.
Turning our attention speciﬁcally to Baltimore, we see that it was by far the weakest of the MTO
interventions. Baltimore was the only site at which experimental group status was not a strong
instrument for moving to a low poverty neighborhood under any deﬁnition (Table 3), and it induced
19Note that Tables 6–8 can be anticipated by combining Table 10 with Tables 3 and 5.
25the least moves to safe neighborhoods (Table 10). Baltimore had negative ITT eﬀects on income and
labor force participation rates, and ITT eﬀects of increased arrest rates for both males and females
(Table 10). These facts are especially noteworthy because Baltimore was also the site at which
there was a strong, hostile response to the program along racial lines (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum
(2000), p 184.). Racial segregation has been found to be the most important factor explaining arrest
rates of MTO youth for violent crimes (Ludwig and Kling (2007)), and this evidence indicates
racial segregation could also be an important factor in explaining other outcomes of interest to
researchers. In terms of designing housing mobility policies, the experience in Baltimore refocuses
attention on racial segregation. This experience also underscores the importance of eﬀectively
communicating the size and concentration of movers in receiving communities, as well as more
research being conducted related to the eﬀects of desegregation policies on receiving communities,
similar to that already conducted on eﬀects from HOPE VI (Hartley (2010)) or Boston’s Metco
program (Angrist and Lang (2004)).
Improving school quality is an obvious goal of housing mobility programs, but there were not
large improvements to school quality made through MTO. Evidence from HOPE VI (Jacob (2004))
and school choice programs (Cullen et al. (2006), Hastings and Weinstein (2008)) indicates that
information may be an important part of this process. As discussed in the literature, school choice
may complicate the design of housing mobility programs. Thirty percent of MTO control group
children in Chicago and Los Angeles were attending magnet schools (Sanbonmatsu, p 684). Since
schools are likely to play a large role in improving youth outcomes, one possibility for the design of
eﬀective housing voucher programs would be to provide a voucher conditional on children attend-
ing a school meeting some criterion, regardless of whether the parents use the voucher to move.
Such an approach to the design of housing voucher programs might look more like a Conditional
Cash Transfer program like Progresa (Todd and Wolpin (2006)) than a traditional housing mobility
program. One program following this model is the St. Paul Early Childhood Scholarship Program,
which gives scholarships to help families access early care and education programs, and requires
that families use these scholarships at programs meeting certain quality rating standards.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented a new perspective on the interpretation of results from MTO, especially
as they relate to neighborhood eﬀects. The paper provided a review of recent advances in the
program evaluation literature in order to make a clear distinction between the interpretation of
Intent to Treat (ITT) and Treatment on the Treated (TOT) parameters as program eﬀects and
Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) parameters as neighborhood eﬀects. Due to the nature
of the LATE, this distinction helped to clarify that results from MTO are only informative about
a small subset of neighborhood eﬀects of interest. The evaluation framework was also used to
emphasize that since the LATE is deﬁned by the subgroup of compliers, diﬀerent instruments will
result in diﬀerent LATE parameters if they induce diﬀerent subpopulations to select into treatment
26(Heckman (1997)). An important implication was that alternative housing mobility programs
designed to induce moves to neighborhoods with characteristics in addition to or in lieu of low
poverty might induce larger eﬀects than MTO.
After this review of the literature, the paper used experimental group status in MTO as an
instrumental variable to estimate the LATEs of various neighborhood characteristics. A ﬁrst step
in this process was to investigate at which sites experimental group status was a strong instru-
ment for neighborhood treatments. Tests for instrument strength showed that MTO induced large
changes in neighborhood poverty rates. However, it was also shown that MTO induced remarkably
little variation in many of the other neighborhood and school characteristics believed to inﬂuence
outcomes and that much of this variation was conﬁned to the tails of these characteristics’ national
distributions. Such characteristics include school quality, as well as the female high school grad-
uation rate and the share of single-headed households in participants’ neighborhood of residence.
This investigation also showed substantial diﬀerences in outcomes across MTO sites, pointing to
the investigation of heterogeneity in program eﬀects from MTO as a fruitful direction for future
research.
LATE estimates at sites where experimental group status was a strong instrument were con-
sistent with prevailing theories of neighborhood eﬀects. Moves to neighborhoods with low poverty
rates, a high degree of personal safety, or a high female labor force participation rate were all as-
sociated with increases in labor force participation. Moves to low poverty and safe neighborhoods
were also associated with improved health outcomes. And although improvements in labor market
outcomes such as employment and income coming from moves to such neighborhoods were not
estimated precisely enough to be statistically signiﬁcant, these eﬀects were improvements and they
were of large magnitudes.
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D∗ =  ∗(Z) − U∗, D = 1{D∗ ≥ 0}, U∗ ∼ U[0,1].
Figure 2: Selection into Treatment
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1Tables
Table 1: D(Z): Treatment as a Function of Assigned Treatment
D(Z) D(0)
D 0 1
D(1) 0 Never-taker Deﬁer
1 Complier Always-taker
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Adults at Baseline (Percent)
Variable Mean SE
Receiving AFDC/TANF 75.08 0.67
HS Diploma 37.73 0.75
GED 18.55 0.60
Working for Pay 25.49 0.67
Nbd Streets Not Safe at Night 49.76 0.77
Applied for Section 8 Before 42.09 0.76
African American 62.75 0.75
Hispanic 30.17 0.71
White or Other 7.08 0.40
HH Member Owns a Car 15.98 0.57
HH Member Disabled 16.05 0.57
HH Member Victim of Crime 41.89 0.76
42Table 3: F-Statistics: Adults
2000 Census Tract Characteristics, Tract of Residence in 2001
Binary Treatment Baltimore Boston Chicago LA NYC All Sites
Program
Moving w/ MTO voucher 178.7 170.7 173.2 294.7 183.0 909.4
Neighborhood Characteristics
Percent in poverty ≤ 20% 2.34 24.28 11.67 27.16 36.68 89.09
Percent in poverty ≤ 10% 6.64 36.31 5.21 54.24 34.97 101.13
Percent minority ≤ 30% 0.67 9.89 0.55 0.93 0.04 5.55
Female HS Grad Rate ≥ 83% 3.45 15.26 5.09 3.84 5.18 30.84
Female BA Attain Rate ≥ 17% 6.62 2.32 5.13 2.89 23.08 32.93
Female LFP ≥ 57% 10.38 3.16 0.26 28.85 20.81 34.33
Female High Stat Occ ≥ 33% 4.55 1.27 6.02 12.91 4.30 19.53
HHs w/ Pub Assist Income ≤ 2% 6.71 10.36 2.01 0.38 1.77 18.58
Single-Headed HHs ≤ 25% 0.70 8.24 3.01 8.68 0.49 13.52
Neighborhood is safe at night 1.26 4.89 11.66 11.97 18.34 44.65
Police come when called 1.38 9.82 4.78 21.50 8.62 38.97
Table 4: F-Statistics: Adults
2000 Census Tract Characteristics, Tract of Residence in 2001
Continuous Treatment Baltimore Boston Chicago LA NYC All Sites
Neighborhood Characteristics
Percent in poverty 7.41 36.18 4.74 54.23 34.99 101.40
Percent minority 2.62 5.95 3.88 10.36 3.24 15.93
Female HS Grad Rate 8.53 25.94 3.59 31.71 32.50 75.41
Female BA Attain Rate 6.38 5.10 6.57 23.15 21.20 50.12
Female LFP 13.67 10.59 2.00 46.82 25.78 61.73
Female High Stat Occ 6.39 6.27 7.06 29.97 13.04 47.93
HHs w/ Pub Assist Income 3.39 21.00 2.82 46.52 25.35 63.67
Single-Headed HHs 5.11 20.51 3.26 27.73 14.56 45.90
43Table 5: F-Statistics: Youth
Treatment Baltimore Boston Chicago LA NYC All Sites
Program
Moving w/ MTO voucher 189.1 150.1 186.5 469.4 199.0 1,033.3
Neighborhood Poverty
Percent in poverty ≤20% 0.33 14.42 20.08 25.87 22.82 71.82
Percent in poverty ≤10% 3.03 16.03 30.24 8.89 3.82 41.13
Percent in poverty 1.46 30.78 14.06 52.06 25.24 95.31
School Characteristics
Rank≥50th percentile on exams 0.88 3.38 4.69 3.19 0.02 8.00
School Ranking on exams 14.30 4.91 13.36 22.10 6.49 40.16
Student/Teacher ratio 2.48 0.03 0.12 1.27 2.07 0.25
Hrs/Week spent on hmwk 0.03 1.56 0.05 1.72 0.82 2.41
Student feels safe at school 0.65 0.56 0.00 5.73 4.23 0.39
School has discipline problems 0.66 0.18 0.46 0.36 0.02 0.00
School has disruption problems 0.02 8.96 1.16 2.69 7.44 1.43
School has good climate 3.79 2.69 0.04 1.98 0.01 0.60
Teacher cares 1.60 2.09 1.46 2.01 0.46 0.19
Peer Group
Friends in old neighborhood 0.77 5.64 0.22 2.13 14.13 14.25
Peer group uses drugs 2.69 1.20 0.04 0.82 0.41 2.24
Peer group carries weapon 1.97 0.76 0.01 0.41 0.23 0.59
Neighborhood Safety
(Parent Reported)
Neighborhood is safe at night 0.00 3.94 13.54 24.94 7.14 39.74
Police come when called 1.26 6.59 2.57 28.80 3.56 29.52
Collective Eﬃcacy
(Parent Reported)
Intervene for skipping school 0.01 7.09 5.31 25.99 1.54 26.72
Intervene for graﬃti 0.15 4.55 4.97 26.22 8.08 34.47
44Table 6: Estimates of Local Average Treatment Eﬀects on Adult Outcomes
Under Various Deﬁnitions of Treatment
Poverty Rate ≤ 20% Poverty Rate ≤ 10% Nbd Safe at Night Female LFP ≥ 57%
  βLATE SE p   βLATE SE p   βLATE SE p   βLATE SE p
Employment
Not in Labor Force –0.26 (0.11) 0.02 –0.57 (0.25) 0.02 –0.36 (0.16) 0.03 –0.34 (0.17) 0.05
Employed 0.10 (0.12) 0.37 0.26 (0.25) 0.29 0.28 (0.16) 0.08 0.29 (0.17) 0.09
Unemployed 0.16 (0.07) 0.03 0.31 (0.15) 0.04 0.08 (0.10) 0.44 0.04 (0.10) 0.71
Income
HH Head’s Income 2,548 (2,276) 0.26 6,217 (4,803) 0.20 6,156 (3,140) 0.05 3,247 (3,311) 0.33
HH Total Income 1,913 (3,632) 0.60 6,254 (8,165) 0.44 4,521 (5,107) 0.38 2,239 (5,724) 0.70
Earnings in 2001 1,677 (2,596) 0.52 3,391 (5,544) 0.54 4,743 (3,281) 0.15 2,005 (3,794) 0.60
Welfare Beneﬁts –0.05 (0.11) 0.66 –0.15 (0.25) 0.54 –0.06 (0.16) 0.71 –0.10 (0.18) 0.57
Health
Mental Distress –0.20 (0.08) 0.01 –0.38 (0.18) 0.03 –0.18 (0.11) 0.10 –0.16 (0.12) 0.18
BMI –4.69 (1.82) 0.01 –7.63 (3.42) 0.03 –5.44 (2.61) 0.04 –3.80 (2.52) 0.13
Depression Last 12 Mos –0.19 (0.09) 0.03 –0.38 (0.20) 0.06 –0.21 (0.12) 0.09 –0.13 (0.14) 0.33
1st Stage Regression
F-Statistic 107.3 46.19 30.6 32.7
Included Sites Boston, Chicago, LA, NYC Boston, LA, NYC Chicago, LA, NYC Baltimore, LA, NYC
P(Z=1) 0.363 0.154 0.679 0.271
P(Z=0) 0.145 0.035 0.498 0.092
4
5Table 7: Estimates of Local Average Treatment Eﬀects on Youth Outcomes
Under Various Deﬁnitions of Treatment
Poverty Rate ≤ 20% Poverty Rate ≤ 10% Nbd Safe at Night
  βLATE SE p   βLATE SE p   βLATE SE p
Problem Behaviors
Ever Smoked Cigarette 0.10 (0.12) 0.38 0.30 (0.36) 0.40 0.22 (0.18) 0.22
Ever Drunk Alcohol –0.16 (0.13) 0.24 –0.26 (0.37) 0.49 0.04 (0.17) 0.82
Ever Arrested –0.08 (0.11) 0.48 –0.13 (0.34) 0.70 –0.11 (0.19) 0.54
School
Currently Enrolled in School –0.01 (0.13) 0.97 –0.14 (0.37) 0.70 0.07 (0.19) 0.72
Idle –0.07 (0.10) 0.52 –0.08 (0.31) 0.81 –0.21 (0.17) 0.21
Health
Asthma 0.13 (0.10) 0.23 0.31 (0.29) 0.28 0.00 (0.14) 0.99
BMI Percentile 1.81 (8.13) 0.82 9.27 (22.03) 0.67 –1.27 (12.16) 0.92
Ever Depressed –0.06 (0.06) 0.28 0.04 (0.18) 0.82 –0.13 (0.10) 0.17
Mental Distress –0.09 (0.07) 0.23 –0.14 (0.19) 0.45 –0.18 (0.10) 0.09
1st Stage Regression
F-Statistic 67.87 30.20 23.68
Included Sites Boston, Chicago, LA, NYC Boston, Chicago Chicago, LA
P(Z=1) 0.348 0.133 0.697
P(Z=0) 0.144 0.030 0.502
4
6Table 8: Estimates of Local Average Treatment Eﬀects on Youth Outcomes
Treatment is Poverty Rate ≤ 20%
Male Female
  βLATE SE p   βLATE SE p
Problem Behaviors
Ever Smoked Cigarette 0.56 (0.29) 0.05 –0.17 (0.14) 0.22
Ever Drunk Alcohol 0.31 (0.25) 0.21 –0.16 (0.17) 0.37
Ever Arrested 0.00 (0.27) 0.99 –0.07 (0.08) 0.37
School
Currently Enrolled in School –0.24 (0.25) 0.34 0.05 (0.15) 0.73
Idle 0.04 (0.21) 0.83 –0.17 (0.11) 0.14
Health
Asthma –0.03 (0.18) 0.87 0.10 (0.17) 0.57
BMI Percentile 17.92 17.43 0.30 –15.85 (11.48) 0.17
Ever Depressed –0.01 (0.08) 0.89 –0.28 (0.12) 0.02
Mental Distress –0.09 (0.14) 0.54 –0.23 (0.11) 0.05
1st Stage Regression
F-Statistic 16.70 39.16




7Table 9: Percent of City’s Minority Group that lived in Neighborhoods 20% White or Less in 1990
City Black Other




Los Angeles 44.9 9.5
New York 57.3 17.8
48Table 10: Estimates of ITT Eﬀects on Outcomes, Control Means, and Baseline Means by Site
Baltimore Boston Chicago LA NYC
  βITT or     SE   βITT or     SE   βITT or     SE   βITT or     SE   βITT or     SE
Adult Outcomes
HH Head’s Income –1,344 (910) –57 (914) 6 (807) –56 (874) 2,861 (845)
Control Mean 12,696 (688) 14,047 (694) 11,075 (618) 11,783 (655) 9,905 (637)
Employed 0.02 (0.05) –0.04 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) 0.11 (0.04)
Control Mean 0.58 (.04) 0.59 (0.03) 0.54 (0.03) 0.46 (0.04) 0.45 (0.03)
Not in Labor Force 0.01 (0.05) –0.02 (0.04) –0.03 (0.04) –0.06 (0.05) –0.11 (0.04)
Control Mean 0.30 (0.04) 0.36 (0.03) 0.32 (0.03) 0.46 (0.04) 0.45 (0.03)
Youth Outcomes
Ever Arrested (Males) 0.09 (0.08) –0.01 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) –0.05 (0.06) 0.09 (0.05)
Control Mean 0.30 (0.06) 0.15 (0.04) 0.33 (0.05) 0.28 (0.05) 0.08 (0.04)
Ever Arrested (Females) 0.06 (0.07) –0.05 (0.04) –0.01 (0.04) –0.03 (0.03) –0.02 (0.03)
Control Mean 0.19 (0.05) 0.10 (0.03) 0.11 (0.03) 0.07 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)
Ever Smoke Cigarette (Females) –0.15 (0.06) –0.10 (0.06) 0.04 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) –0.04 (0.05)
Control Mean 0.29 (0.05) 0.32 (0.04) 0.13 (0.04) 0.12 (0.03) 0.20 (0.04)
Baseline Characteristics
Share Movers 0.53 0.44 0.31 0.66 0.44
Share Black 0.97 0.37 0.99 0.49 0.48
Share Hispanic 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.47 0.50
Share HOPE VI 0.46 0.20 0.36 0.15 0.00
Car Ownership 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.40 0.06
4
9Table 11: Estimates of ITT Eﬀects on Neighborhood Characteristics and Control Means by Site
Baltimore Boston Chicago LA NYC
  βITT or     SE   βITT or     SE   βITT or     SE   βITT or     SE   βITT or     SE
Neighborhood Characteristics
Streets Safe at Night 0.06 (0.05) 0.11 (0.04) 0.15 (0.04) 0.16 (0.05) 0.21 (0.04)
Control Mean 0.63 (0.04) 0.62 (0.03) 0.60 (0.03) 0.44 (0.04) 0.45 (0.03)
Percent Minority –4.46 (2.51) –8.48 (2.71) –2.42 (1.28) –5.87 (1.63) –3.57 (1.48)
Control Mean 87.85 (1.86) 72.38 (2.06) 95.97 (0.98) 93.34 (1.21) 93.89 (1.12)
Share Single-Headed HHs –0.05 (0.02) –0.08 (0.02) –0.03 (0.02) –0.08 (0.02) –0.08 (0.02)
Control Mean 0.72 (0.02) 0.60 (0.01) 0.71 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.66 (0.01)
Share of Females HS Grads 0.05 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.11 (0.02) 0.09 (0.01)
Control Mean 0.59 (0.01) 0.66 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 0.41 (0.01) 0.52 (0.01)
Share of Females Hold BA 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)
Control Mean 0.11 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01)
Female LFP Rate 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01)
Control Mean 0.49 (0.01) 0.53 (0.01) 0.52 (0.01) 0.43 (0.01) 0.40 (0.01)
School Characteristics
School Percentile (Test Scores) 5.87 (1.41) 3.55 (1.32) 2.73 (0.69) 5.93 (1.08) 3.67 (1.45)
Control Mean 15.55 (1.05) 19.25 (0.98) 9.27 (0.53) 16.33 (0.81) 13.49 (1.07)
5
0